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Existing international law and existing national law do not
adequately protect us against the serious threats to our
existence. Our cultures, our religions, our governments and
our ways of life are all in danger. We are not simply
individuals with individual groups. We are a peoples, not
simply individuals. For these reasons we face unique prob-
lems. Special measures are required to meet these problems.
If these measures are not taken, more and more indigenous
people may be destroyed their cultures vanished forever.'
The above statement by Chief Jake Swamp describes concerns that
are particular to indigenous peoples such as native Americans (Indi-
ans).2 Although many laws still do not adequately address their con-
cerns, some United States legislation protects and preserves Indian
* J.D., 1992, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., 1982, University of Min-
nesota. Currently in private practice and devoting part time to ICWA cases pro bono
for the Upper Midwest American Indian Center; also presently involved in committee'
which is drafting a tribal-state agreement for the governance of Minnesota's ICWA
cases.
I am deeply indebted and grateful to the following people for their inspiration,
understanding, and sharing of knowledge: Professor Paul Marino; Bertram Hirsch;
Shelly Mclntire, and Adrienne (Jay) Bendix. To all of them I say "Megwitch" ("Thank
you" in Ojibwe).
1. Chief Jake Swa'mp of the Mohawk Nation, Address to United Nations Com-
mission on Human Rights (May 7, 1982) (in support of establishing a working group
to focus on indigenous populations, which was established in 1982), U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/sub. 2/1982/33 annex. On August 26, 1982, the working group transmitted
principles to the United Nations Human Rights Sub-Commission. One principle stated
that indigenous peoples should be free of political intervention which results in the
"destruction or disintegration of their physical, cultural, or political integrity." U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1982/Rl. Also, a UN resolution guarantees all children the
right to a culture. See Declaration of the Rights of the Child (Nov. 20, 1959), U.N.
Doc. A/Res./1386, Principle III, as affirmed by Resolution 31-169 (Dec. 21, 1976).
2. Although the current preference is to refer to Indians as native Americans, this
note uses the term Indians, in the colloquial sense, to refer to all indigenous peoples
of the United States. See 25 U.S.C. § 1151 (1988).
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cultures. One such legislative measure is the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (ICWA).
3
The provisions of the ICWA statutorily define the best interests of
Indian children. Generally speaking, both family and juvenile laws
delineate what encompasses any child's best interest when issues con-
cerning a child's future are at stake. The ICWA, however, expands
upon the usual factors of the best interest analysis. Overall, the ICWA
statutorily insists that the best interest of an Indian child are inter-
twined with the interests of that child's Indian culture and peoples.
To accomplish this, the ICWA imposes federal standards for courts
to follow in custody cases involving Indian children.
Reflecting on the above purposes of the Act makes people aware of
the problems which concern and are unique to Indian people. The
State of Minnesota has also taken legislative steps to help alleviate the
concerns of Indian people so they may retain their culture. However,
courts do not consistently comply with such laws. Efforts must be
undertaken to ameliorate this noncompliance.
"Non-Indian lawyers, social workers and judges perceive the neces-
sity of terminating parental rights of Indian citizens through quite
different cultural lenses in their attempts to help Indian children."
' 4
We cannot easily alter such perceptions. Yet, we can constrain and
change the manner in which non-Indian people exercise their power
over Indians. To combat and control bias by those in power we can
mandate the involvement of competent Indian cultural experts sensitive
to subtleties of Indian ways. Also, the safeguards incorporated into
the ]ICWA must be strictly enforced to secure the well-being and future
existence of tribes. We must all remember that "[i]t is not the function
of our courts to homogenize [a state's] society." 5
II. The Effect of Public Law 280 on Tribes in Minnesota
The ICWA has several purposes. First, the Act promotes the con-
gressional responsibility of the United States to protect the integrity
of Indian tribes as separate and viable political entities. Second, the
Act enables Indian children to become well-adjusted adult Indians
secure in their cultural identity. Finally, the act protects the cultural
3. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988
& Supp. 1990)).
4. In re Welfare of B.W., 454 N.W.2d 437, 444 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (establishing
strict guidelines for qualified expert witnesses in ICWA cases).
5. Carle v. Carle, 503 P.2d 1050, 1055 (Alaska 1972). The court, in Carle,
remanded a divorce proceeding custody determination. The lower court was instructed
on remand to determine the best interest of a Native Alaskan child based on rational
and unbiased information. The Alaska Supreme Court found that the trial court had
exhibited a cultural bias against the native village way of life when it awarded custody
to the mother who lived in urban society. Id.
238
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identity of each Indian tribal community as well as each individual
Indian person. This note will explore these factors in detail.
In the 1950s, the federal government entered into what has been
termed as the "termination era." During this era, the policy of the
federal government was to quickly "make the Indians within the
territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and
entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to
other citizens of the United States, [and] to end their status as wards
of the United States." '6 The termination policy, served to end federal
responsibility, including financial responsibility, over Indian people.
This policy effectively shifted certain responsibilities from the federal
government to the states. As a result, several tribes lost their tribal
status and financial benefits and, thus, were terminated.7 Further,
tribal lands during this era were converted into private, rather than
tribal, Indian ownership; and the federal government sold some tribal
land outright to non-Indians with the proceeds going to the tribes. 8
Congress expressly adopted the termination policy by passing Public
Law 280.9 Pursuant to Public Law 280, certain states assumed juris-
diction over civil and criminal disputes in Indian territory.'0 Minnesota
is one state still subject to Public Law 280. However, the Red Lake
Reservation of the Minnesota Chippewa Tribe is excluded from Public
Law 280. Red Lake retained jurisdiction over its own affairs and has
an organized tribal court system to adjudicate issues. Consequently,
Red Lake is still not subject to state jurisdiction for many matters.
Today, Public Law 280 largely eliminates federal restrictions on
jurisdiction and authorizes state courts to assume jurisdiction over civil
causes of action in Minnesota to which Indians are parties." For the
most part, civil laws of general application to non-Indian individuals
have full force and effect in Indian Country.' 2 Public Law 280 was
intended to "redress the lack of adequate Indian forums."' 3 However,
it arguably hinders tribal self-determination because it gives state courts
jurisdiction over internal tribal affairs. This assertion of state jurisdic-
6. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
7. See id. The Menominee tribe of Wisconsin was one such terminated tribe. This
tribe was later reestablished.
8. Id.
9. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 53-280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1161-1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322, 28 U.S.C. § 1360
(1988)). See also Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of the State Juris-
diction over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535 (1975).
10. Id. The original states were California, Minnesota (except Red Lake Reserva-
tion), Nebraska, Oregon (except Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin. Alaska
was included in 1958.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988).
12. Id.
13. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 383 (1976) (analysis of state authority
under Public Law 280 to impose taxes on reservation Indians).
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tion inherently diminishes tribal self-authority. Before and after Public
Law 280, Indian tribes have struggled to retain the right of self-
determination over their own affairs.
III. The Self-Determination Movement
Tribes finally regained some authority over internal affairs during
the 1960s and 1970s. The concept of Indian self-determination gained
momentum in 1968 when President Johnson gave a special message to
Congress stressing the fact that Indians should have a right to deter-
mine their own choice between life in the city or on the reservation
without the threat of tribal termination. 14 Following the president's
message, Congress passed title IV of the Indian Civil Rights Act. This
Act allowed states to impose jurisdiction over Indian lands and people
only in cases where affected tribes gave their consent." In 1970,
President Nixon proposed a federal policy of self-determination.' 6 The
policy federally recognized tribes as distinct political entities which
could control their own destiny yet retain the aid of the federal
government to carry out that destiny.17 At that time, President Nixon
stated that "[w]e must assure the Indian that he can assume control
of his own life without being separated voluntarily from the tribal
group. And we must make it clear that Indians can become independent
of federal control without being cut off from federal concern and
federal support." 18 As a result of the self-determination policy, several
major pieces of legislation were enacted, including the ICWA. 19
IV. A Social Crisis Necessitates the ICWA
Enacted for social reasons, the ICWA also fulfilled political motives
14. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Special Message to the Congress on Goals and
Programs for the American Indian: "The Forgotten America," 4 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 438 (Mar. 11, 1968).
1:5. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 401-402, 406, 82 Stat. 78-80
(codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1322, 1326 (1988)); see also Barbara A. Atwood, Fighting
Over Indian Children: The Uses and Abuses of Jurisdictional Ambiguity, 36 UCLA L.
REv. [051, 1073 (1989). The Act imposes a bill of rights for Indians which is similar
to the Bill of Rights in the Constitution. The Act places concrete limits on the actions
of tribes which impose legal sentences.
16. President Richard M. Nixon, The President's Message to Congress Transmitting
Recommendations for Indian Policy, 6 WEEKLY COMP. Pars. Doc. 894-905 (July 13,
1970).
17. Id.
1& Id. at 896.
19. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988).
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of the self-determination policy. Prior to enactment of the ICWA, a
social crisis of major proportions threatened the cultural existence of
American Indian people. Since the 1800s, a general assimilationist
policy had existed in America. As part of that policy, the government
took Indian children from their homes and sent them to boarding
schools operated by the Federal Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).2°
These boarding schools were mostly located on the East Coast, a great
distance from most tribes' reservations. The schools began in the 1800s
as manual-labor schools that trained boys in agricultural skills or the
common trades and trained girls in the domestic tasks of white house-
holds.21 A few day schools were also available on Indian reservations. 22
However, these day schools were not historically deemed adequate by
the government. Governmental authorities thought that "the exposure
of the children who attend only day-schools to the demoralization and
degradation of an Indian home neutralized the efforts of the school
teacher especially those efforts which [were] directed to advancement
in morality and civilization."' ' The boarding schools' goals were to
assimilate Indian children into white society by teaching them white
skills and by keeping them away from their Indian families during the
school year, and many times even during the summer months. These
practices show that the government strategically destroyed a good deal
Indian culture.
Aside from sending away children to boarding schools, the govern-
ment took other Indian children away from their tribes permanently.
Non-Indian families adopted these children and deprived them of their
Indian culture. In 1974, Senator Abourezk of South Dakota stated:
For decades Indian parents and their children have been at
the mercy or abusive action of ... [un]warranted removal
of children from their homes .... Officials would seemingly
rather place Indian children in non-Indian settings where
their Indian traditions and, in general, their entire Indian
way of life is smothered.A
20. Margaret Howard, Transracial Adoption: Analysis of the Best Interest Standard,
59 NoTRE DAm L. Rnv. 503, 519 (1984) (citing Task Force Four Report on Federal
and Tribal Jurisdiction, S. REP. No. 597, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 45 (1977) (other citations
omitted)). The BIA was originally part of the War Department but was transferred to
the Department of Interior in 1849. See Wunmis C. CANBY, JR., AmERiCAN INDIAN
LAW IN A NUTsHELL 16-17 (2d ed. 1988).
21. 2 FRANcIs P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER, THE UNITED STATES GovERNmENT
AND THE AmimcAN INDIAN 689 (1984).
22. Id.
23. Indian Child Welfare Program, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian
Affairs of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.




Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1992
242 AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW [Vol. 17
Also, the same year that the Senate discussed these issues, "Indian
parents and officials all across the United States [were] protesting what
they described as cultural or legal 'genocide' inflicted by County, State
and Federal agencies that sanction or participate in the wholesale
removal of Indian children from their homes and reservations."
' 5
The legislative history of the ICWA acknowledged the social crisis.
Congress found that boarding schools and non-Indian out-of-home
placements were the two major contributors to the destruction of
Indian families and community life.26 In 1969, the House report on
the :CWA stated that "approximately 85 percent of all Indian children
in foster care were living in non-Indian homes. ' 27 Also in 1974,
"approximately 25-35 percent of all Indian children were separated
from their families and placed in foster adoptive homes or institu-
tion,.' 'n
In the ICWA legislative reports, the prominence of Minnesota's
statistics are disturbingly prominent. For example, in Minnesota in
1974, state agencies removed Indian children from their parents at an
alarmingly high rate. In fact, state agencies placed Indian children in
foster care or adoptive homes at a per capita rate five times higher
than the same placement for nof-Indian children.29 This meant that
many Indian children were not living with their Indian families. In
1972, one out of eight Minnesotan Indians under the age of eighteen
and nearly one out of four Indian infants under one year of age lived
in adoptive homes.30 Finally, by 1978, over 90% of the Indian children
adopted by non-relatives were adopted by non-Indian couples.3 Thus,
state agencies separated these children from their families and also
from their Indian culture. The passage of the ICWA was a major step
toward curbing this wholesale removal of Indian children from their
famiies and heritage.
V. The Indian Child Welfare Act
Bemuse states, such as Minnesota, removed so many Indian children
from their families and placed them in non-Indian homes, Congress
25. Edwin McDowell, The Indian Adoption Problem, NVALL ST. J., July 12, 1974,
at 6.
26. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
7530, 7531 [hereinafter HousE REPORT].
27. Id. (citing Association of American Indian Affairs, Inc., Indian Child Welfare
Statistical Survey (July 1976) (AAA Survey), in Indian Child Welfare Act of 1977:
Hearings on S. 1214 Before the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong.,







enacted the ICWA. The provisions of the ICWA help resolve the
inherent conflict between the federal government's jurisdiction over
Indian affairs and the exclusive right of states to have jurisdiction
over child custody matters. Congress balanced its exercise of plenary
power over Indian affairs and its trust responsibilities to Indian people
by enacting the ICWA.32 The Act allows states to retain their traditional
authority over child custody proceedings but imposes federal standards
for states to follow in cases where courts remove Indian children from
their parents.33 This statutory compromise resolves the tension between
exclusive federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs and exclusive state
jurisdiction over child custody matters.
The ICWA serves to "protect the best interests of Indian children
and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and fami-
lies. ' 34 The Act recognizes that a tribe's integrity and very existence
depend upon control over the adoption and foster home placements
of Indian children. 3 Under the ICWA, even tribes subject to state
jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280 can reassume tribal jurisdiction
over child custody proceedings. To reassume jurisdiction, a tribe must
go through a petitioning process through the Secretary of Interior. A
petitioning tribe must present a detailed plan to the Secretary which
includes establishment of some type of adjudicatory system such as a
court. The Secretary must approve the petition before a tribe can assert
exclusive or partial jurisdiction over custody proceedings. 36 Therefore,
Minnesota tribes subject to Public Law 280 must establish an appro-
priate system for handling child custody cases and have a petition
approved by the Secretary to assume jurisdiction. To date, none have
done so.
Further, to receive federal funds for implementing an appropriate
adjudicatory system, the tribe or tribal court must show that it will
adhere to BIA procedures and the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.
These requirements ensure that Indian people are given constitutional
rights, including due process in custody cases decided by tribal sys-
tems. 37 Thus, any tribal system must provide legal safeguards and
32. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988). The government has a federal responsibility to Indian
people. Also, Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs by virtue of U.S. CoNsT.
art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Protection of the integrity of Indian families is a permissible goal that
is tied to the fulfillment of Congress' unique guardian obligation for Indians. See Angus
v. Joseph, 655 P.2d 208 (Or. Ct. App. 1982), reh'g denied, 660 P.2d 683 (Or. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 830 (1983).
33. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1902 (1988).
34. Id. § 1902.
35. FELIX S. COHEN'S HANDBOOK oF FEDERAL INDN LAw 241 (Rennard Strickland
et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter CoHEN].
36. 25 U.S.C. § 1918 (1988) (Minnesota tribes, except the Red Lake Reservation,
are subject to Public Law 280).
37. Kathryn A. Carver, The 1985 Minnesota Indian Preservation Act: Claiming a
Cultural Identity, 4 LAw & INEQ. J. 327, 342-43 (1986).
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The ICWA applies to situations where the state places Indian chil-
dren in nonparental custody, either voluntarily by their parents or
involuntarily. 39 The Act does not apply to parental custody cases that
arise out of a divorce proceeding.4 Also, the Act does not apply to
juvenile placements that are a consequence of the child's acts "which,
if committed by an adult, would be deemed a crime."
'41
Before a court may apply the ICWA to a given case, the following
initial determinations must be made:42 First, is the child an "Indian
child" as defined under ICWA section 1903(3) and (4)?43 and second,
is the proceeding a "child custody proceeding" as defined under ICWA
section 1903(1)?" If the answer to both of these questions is yes, the
remaining provisions of the Act apply to the case.
If the Act does apply, an Indian tribe which has an authorized tribal
adjudicatory system or court which exists at law or has been authorized
by petition through the Secretary, as discussed above, may assume
jurisdiction over the proceeding. If the Indian child is residing or
domiciled on the reservation or is a ward of the tribal court, the tribe
can assume exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.45 The ICWA states
that any proceeding originating in the state court shall be transferred
to the tribe "absent good cause to the contrary" or "absent objection
by either parent."" If good cause or parental objection exist the state
court retains the case. However, if the proceeding remains in the state
court, the tribe may intervene at any point in the proceeding and
become involved as an interested party.47 Finally, a determination by
either the tribal or state court will be given full faith and credit by
the other respective court.
4
1
,8. Id. at 343.
39. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988).
40. See generally Dement v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court, 874 F.2d 510 (8th Cir.
1989); Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
41. See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988).
42. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 42 (1989).
43. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1903(3), (4) (1988). The determination of whether the child is an
Indian child requires consideration of the tribal membership or tribal eligibility of the
child and parents, as well as the status of the child's tribe as a recognized tribe of the
United States. Also, the child must be under eighteen and unmarried. Id.
44. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988). A child custody proceeding is a foster care place-
ment, a preadoptive placement, adoptive placement, or termination of parental rights
proceeding. Id.
45. Id. § 1911(a).
45. Id. § 1911(b).
47. Id. § 1911(c).
43. Id. § 1911(d).
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A state court that retains jurisdictibn must complywith the standards
for pending court proceedings set forth in the ICWA section 1912.49
Pursuant to this section, the tribe must receive notification of each
"involuntary" placement proceeding." Further, in all placement cases,
voluntary or involuntary, the party effecting the action, many times
the state's department of human services, must prove to the court that
"active efforts" have beeht made to prevent the existing family's
breakup and that those efforts failed."1 Additionally, in foster care
placements and termination .proceedings, "qualified expert witnesses"
must present supporting testimony that continued custody by either
the parent or Indian custodian will likely result in some serious emo-
tional or physical damage to the child.5 2 Overall, any custodial place-
ment of an Indian child can be effected only by a showing of some
harm to the child. The burden of proof to effect a foster care placement
is the "clear and convincing" evidence standard. 3 On the other hand,
courts may terminate parental rights solely by evidence proving harm
"beyond a reasonable doubt."54
If after taking into account the active efforts, witness testimony,
and appropriate burden of proof a court decides to place a child in
nonparental care, the court must determine appropriate placement.
When a court places an Indian child in either foster or adoptive care,
it must adhere to specified placement preferences in the absence of
"good cause to the contrary." 5 The ICWA mandates preferences and
prioritizes choices for a child's custodial placement in the following
order: (1) with the child's extended family, (2) a member of the child's
tribe, (3) another Indian family or tribally approved institution, or, as
a final resort, (4) a non-Indian family or institution.56 In all ICWA
custody cases, the court must evaluate the preferences by considering
the prevailing social and cultural standards of the Indian tribal com-
munity most closely related to the child's family.5 The remaining
49. Id. § 1912.
50. Id. § 1912(a).
51. Id. § 1912(d).
52. Id. § 1912(e)-(f).
53. Id. § 1912(e).
54. Id. § 1912(f).
55. Id. § 1915. Good cause is not defined in the Act and there are no Minnesota
cases which define it to date. However, the BIA published guidelines which give factors
for determining the existence of good cause. The three factors are: (1) the request of
the parent; (2) extraordinary needs of. the 'child as established by qualified expert
witnesses; and (3) the unavailabilify. of a suitable Indian home. See BIA Guidelines for
State Courts: Indian Child Custody. Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,594 F.3 (1979).
56. Id.
57. Id. The tribal community must. be the one in which the parent or extended
family resides or with which the parent or extended family members maintain social
and cultural ties.
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ICWA provisions particularize the procedures, funding, and record-
keeping standards for implementing the Act.
VI. Placement Statistics After the ICWA
A number of reports since 1978 indicate that courts and agencies
place Indian children into Indian homes more often than was done
prior to the ICWA. However, courts and agencies still place Indian
children in non-Indian homes in Minnesota as well as in other states.
Nationally, in 1983, Indian children were placed in foster care with
Indian relatives at a rate of only 1.1%, which is a much lower rate
than the placements with relatives for any other ethnic group.58 A
report in 1987 revealed that there was an overall reduction in foster
care placement in the early 1980s after enactment of the ICWA.5 9
However, an increase in nonparental placements in the mid-1980s
followed this reduction: °
By 1988, one report stated that "the rate of placement of Indian
children in substitute care [was] 3.6 times greater than that of their
non-Indian counterparts - 25 percent increase over a six-year pe-
riod." ( This report's conclusion states that efforts to comply with the
ICWA are limited, implementation is uneven, and in some localities
noncompliance is quite pronounced 2 A need for expanded preventa-
tive services exists. 63
Although no one can achieve perfect compliance, evidence suggests
greater placement in Indian homes. For example, 62.2% of Indian
children in 1986 were placed in Indian or Alaskan native homesA4 In
53. MAXIMUS, Inc., Final Report, Child Welfare Indicator Survey: Volume I at
111-24 (Oct. 21, 1983) (unpublished report, on file with the American Indian Law Review)
(prepared for the U.S. Health and Human Services, Office of Human Development
Services Office of Program Development and Administration for Children, Youth and
Families (Children's Bureau)).
59. Cecilia Sudia, Impact of the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act and the 1980
Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act on the Out of Home Placement of American
Indian Children (July 1987) (unpublished survey by the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, Office of Human Development Services Office of Program Develop-
ment and Administration for Children, Youth and Families) (Children's Bureau)); see
also System Provides FY 85 Data on Indian Child Placements, LiNKAoEs, (Bureau of
Indian Affairs, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1987, at 11.
60. Id.
61. Margaret C. Plantz et al., Indian Child Welfare: A Status Report at 3-2 (Apr.
18, 1988) (unpublished report, on file with the American Indian Law Review) (subtitled
"Final Report of the Survey of Indian Child Welfare and Implementation of the Indian
Child Welfare Act and Section 428 of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act
of 1980") (ACYF/BIA contract no. 105-82-1602).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3-27 (tbl. 3-9).
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Minnesota, Indian children were placed in Indian homes at a rate of
63.1% .6 These figures indicate some effort to comply with the Indian
placement preferences of the ICWA.
Unfortunately, the above statistics do not reflect the total picture.
American Indians comprise only 1.30o to 2.5% of the general popu-
lation.16 However, a recent Minnesota survey found that Indian chil-
dren account for 7% of the total number of children placed in out-
of-home care.67 Further, Indian children constitute 16% of all children
in extended placements in Minnesota.A These figures indicate an ap-
parent low success ratio in keeping together and reuniting Indian
families. There are numerous and complex reasons for these statistics.
One prominent reason remains the lack of compliance with the ICWA.
The Minnesota survey also includes a report to the Minnesota legis-
lature stating that agencies and courts need better coordination with
the ICWA.6 9 The report goes on to state that the overall rate of
reunification between minority parents and their children remains lower
than that same rate for whites.70 Cultural bias in our legal system is
one explanation for this low success ratio.
VII. Minnesota Indian Child Welfare Statutes
Minnesota continually passes legislation to remedy the low success
of keeping minority families intact. In 1985, Minnesota incorporated
the ICWA into state law by enacting the Minnesota Indian Family
Preservation Act (MIFPA) . 7 This Act adopted the general provisions
of the ICWA but added some more stringent criteria. For example,
under the MIFPA, agencies or courts contemplating any out-of-home
placement or adoptive placement must send notice to the tribe.7 2 This
requires a higher notification standard than the ICWA, which mandates
notice to the tribe only for involuntary proceedings.
When a Minnesota court extinguishes parents' custodial rights to
their child, a court must consider the action in light of the termination
of parental rights statute found in Minnesota's juvenile laws.73 Under
this statute, both voluntary and involuntary parental right terminations
recognize the child's best interests to be of paramount consideration. 74
65. Id.
66. (MINN. LEGISLATUrEa) CHILD PROTECTION SYSTEM STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT
49 (1990) [hereinafter MIN. FINAL REPORT].
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2 (systems committee summary).
70. Id. at 49.
71. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 257.35 to 257.3579 (West Supp. 1991).
72. Id. §§ 257.352 subdivision 2-3, 257.353 subdivision 2.
73. Id. §§ 257.35(d), 260.221.
74. Id. § 260.221 subdivision 4.
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In 1988, the Minnesota legislature added a provision to the termination
statute to mandate courts to determine the best interests of an Indian
child consistent with the ICWA.7 5 This requirement should facilitate
implementation of the appropriate best interest standards for Indian
children in Minnesota. Other Minnesota statutes governing custody
determinations require courts to consider any child's cultural back-
ground as a determinative factor in deciding to place a child out of
his/her home.7 6 Therefore, Minnesota's statutes acknowledge the min-
imum federal standards of the ICWA and provide some higher criteria.
VIII. The Holyfield Decision
Minnesota's courts frequently face the difficult task of deciding
where to place an Indian child. The ICWA, Minnesota statutes, and
couirt decisions provide guidance for making such determinations. The
ICWA states that it
is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of
Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum
federal standards for the removal of Indian children from
their families and the placement of such children in foster
or adoptive homes which will reflect the unique values of
Indian culture ....
This policy should be applied by state court judges and state admin-
istrative agencies when they interpret the provisions of the Act and
place Indian children. s It is not always easy to balance the individual
and tribal interests when determining an Indian child's best interest.
A recent Supreme Court decision, Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians v. Holyfeld79 clarifies the competing interests among parent,
child, and tribe. The Court recognized it must prioritize these interests
according to tribal custom. 0 Holyfield involved a proposed voluntary
adoption proceeding concerning twins born to two unmarried members
75. Id.
715. See id. § 518.17 subdivision l(a)(1l) (best interest factors); id. § 257.025(h)
(custody dispute factors); id. § 259.28 (best interest factors applied to adoptions); Id.
§ 260.181 subdivision 3 (juvenile dispositions must consider a child's ethnic heritage in
foster care placements).
77. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
78. Craig J. Dorsay, The Indian Child Welfare Act and Laws Affecting Indian
Juveniles (June 1984) (unpublished report) (prepared for the Indian Law Support Center
of the Native American Rights Fund; on file with Minnesota Indian Women's Resource
Center, Minneapolis, Minn.
79. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
80. Donna J. Goldsmith, Individualism vs. Collective Rights: The Indian Child




of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians. The parents wanted to
give the twins up for adoption to a non-Indian couple. However, the
tribe wanted the exclusive right to determine the twins' custody.
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the twins, who
were born outside the confines of the reservation, were "domiciled"
on the reservation. The issue of domicile remained crucial to the tribe's
assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over the custody matter."' The Court
found the twins' domicile to be the reservation.Y At the same time,
the Court established five uniform federal rules for determining dom-
icile:"3 (1) a child acquires domicile at birth which continues until a
new one is acquired; (2) the domicile of a minor child is determined
by the domicile of the parents; (3) the domicile of an illegitimate child
is the same as the mother's domicile; (4) the domicile of an abandoned
child is the domicile of the last abandoning parent; and (5) a tribal
member cannot waive a tribe's jurisdiction by giving birth and exe-
cuting a consent for adoption off the reservation.
4
Although the strict holding in Holyfield only construes the term
"domicile" under the ICWA, the decision also sets forth strong policy
statements and principals for future courts to follow. Primarily, the
Court said that "[t]ribal jurisdiction under § 1911(a) was not meant
to be defeated by the actions of individual members of the tribe."Ss
s
Further, the Court explicitly analyzed the congressional intent of the
ICWA finding that the Act purposefully protects tribal interests and
culture which go beyond the wishes of individual parents. 6 The Court
understood the fact that Indian cultures focus on the collective rights
of the community, permitting individual rights to bow more readily
to the needs of the community." Exemplifying this knowledge, the
Court stated that "tribal interest is at the core of the ICWA, which
recognizes that the tribe has an interest in the child which is distinct
from but on parity with the interest of the parents." 8 Therefore, the
best interests of an Indian child must be determined by consideration
of both tribal and individual parental interests. Finally, the Court in
81. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 43. Under the ICWA (28 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988)), a
tribe may assume exclusive jurisdiction if the child is domiciled within the reservation
of such tribe.
82. Id. at 53.
83. The Court stated that "Congress intended a uniform federal law of domicile
for the ICWA." Id. at 47.
84. Id. at 48, 52-53.
85. Id. at 49.
86. Id. at 49-50.
87. Goldsmith, supra note 80, at 1. Tribes differ widely in organization and beliefs,
but this general factor is integral to all tribes.
88. Holyfeld, 490 U.S. at 52 (quoting In re Adoption of Holloway, 732 P.2d 962,
969-70 (Utah 1986)); see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1971) (a parent's
right to raise and nurture a child is an essential and basic civil right).
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Hoyfield deferred the ultimate custody decision to the "experience,
wisdom and compassion of the [tribal court]. ' 89 The tribe then assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over the matter.
After the tribe assumed jurisdiction, "the tribal court appointed a
guardian ad litem for the [twins], demanded proof of paternity from
the father and conducted a thorough investigation of Ms. Holyfield.""
After weighing all the information, the "Tribal Court Judge granted
adoption of the children to Ms. Holyfield." 91 The Court decided the
placement was in the best interest of the children.9 The Holyfield
decision and the subsequent tribal action reaffirmed both the tribe's
right and ability to make a wise and compassionate decision. Also,
Holyfleld sends a strong message to lower courts to allow tribal courts
the right to determine the future of Indian children.
IX. The Effect of the Best Interest Standard
The standards for the best interest of an Indian child as set forth
in the ICWA93 and interpreted in Holyfield are integrally related to
the Future interest and survival of Indian tribes. Congress considered
the alternatives to the "best interests of the child" principle in 1974
hearings prior to the ICWA's enactment.95 Members considered the
"best interest" principle "vague and nebulous." 96 One alternative
which Congress discussed stated "what would be least detrimental to
the child." 97 This concept included factors such as promptness of the
custodial decision, determination of the child's "psychological parent,"
and determination of the party who could best meet the child's needs.9
However, Congress eventually drafted the ICWA using the terms "the
best interests of Indian children." 99 Provisions of the Act enumerate
specific criteria to meet this best interest standard.
89. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 54. Even though there was concern because the twins
had already been with the prospective adoptive mother for three years, the Court still
deferred the final placement decision to the tribe. Id. at 53-54.
90. Marcia Coyle, It's Never Quite Over When It's Over, Parties Before the Supreme
Court Find Out, Tim NAT'L L.J., Feb. 25, 1991, at 1, 24. Ms. Holyfield was a non-
Indian woman seeking to adopt the twins. At the time the Supreme Court decided the
case, Mr. Holyfield was deceased.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
94. See generally Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 30.
95. 1974 Hearings, supra note 23, at 57-58 (Dr. Mindell's recommendations to the








Additionally, in all parental rights termination proceedings in Min-
nesota before 1981, courts construed the general termination statute
by applying a "parental fitness standard."'' 1 This fitness standard
emphasized a parent's fundamental right to custody by depriving
parents of that right only when they were found to be unfit. 01 In the
alternative, the "best interest" standard focuses on the child's needs.
12
Eventually, in In re J.J.B., the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that
the "best interest" standard applies to termination proceedings. 103
Today, this standard is codified in the Minnesota statutes, as discussed
in section VI.
Using the best interest standard which focuses on the child's needs,
courts apply psychological factors such as the psychological parent
theory and the theory of bonding. Bonding is the attachment infants
have for parents, generally the mother, from infancy. °4 On the other
hand, the psychological parent theory states that a severance of the
parent-child bond will inflict irreparable psychological harm and dam-
age upon the child.10 A parent or substitute parent becomes a "psy-
chological parent" by bonding with a child.' 6
It is difficult to define the quality of a relationship between a child
and another person or to make determinations about whether a parent's
rights should be terminated."' 7 Courts must assess facts and make
predictions about a child's future. As a result, this vague best interest
standard allows decision makers to be influenced by prejudice and
preconceptions. 03 Therefore, decision makers, such as courts, often
favor substitute families over rehabilitation of existing Indian families.
This favoritism is due in part to misconceptions about cultures and a
lack of economic resources by tribes and states for rehabilitation.' 9
The ICWA's greater emphasis on cultural environment than family
permanency reflects the "best interests" principle for Indian children."0
100. Gloria Christopherson, Minnesota Developments, Minnesota Adopts a Best
Interest Standard in Parental Rights Termination Proceedings: In re J.J.B., 71 MINN.
L. Ray. 1263, 1276 (1987).
101. Id. at 1270.
102. Id. at 1269.
103. In re J.J.B., 390 N.W.2d 274, 279 (Minn. 1986).
104. EVELYN LANCE BLANCHARD, M.S.W., THE QUESTION op BEST INTEREST REVIS-
ITED 8 (1988). Ms. Blanchard has a Master's Degree in Social Work and is a widely
published authority on Indian children's issues. The bonding concept was developed by
a psychiatrist, John Bowlby, in the 1950s.
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 9.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Evelyn L. Blanchard & Russel L. Barsh, What Is Best for Tribal Children? A
Response to Fischler, 25 SociAL WoRK 350, 356-57 (1980).
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American society as a whole is lacking any one culture. Rather, it is
"at best a crazy quilt culture of disintegrating values."", Anglo-
Americans seem to reject culture as an essential factor in a child's
development, an attitude contrary to the goals of the ICWA." 2 The
ICWA's emphasis on culture reflects the unique needs of Indian people.
A. viable Indian identity can give true shape to the Indian child's
emerging character. Once a child has a strong cultural identity, that
child can then choose the facets of American society that most enhance
the child's cultural integrity, that most enhance the child's "best
interest.""' 3 An Indian child, like any child, is born to a biological
family. However, unlike other children, an Indian child is born into
a kinship network, clan, or band." 4 From the Indian perspective, a
newborn child renews support to the tribal group.' Indian children
develop a strong sense of community because individual goals inter-
twine with the community goals." 6 As more Indians become psychol-
ogists and social workers, a greater understanding of Indian culture
emerges in society. "17 Consequently, tribes take more control of tribal
children's issues and psychological research."' For instance, a tribal
member, as a psychologist or social worker, can with firsthand knowl-
edge assess a custody case from the Indian perspective.
Presently, biases still exist and states still place Indian children in
non-Indian homes. Dr. Joseph Westermeyer has spent years researching
the effect of non-Indian placements on Indian children. He studied a
number of Indians raised in white homes. As a result, he found a
psychological condition present in these children which he labels the
"apple syndrome.""' 9 The apple syndrome analogizes the Indian to an
apple - red on the outside but white on the inside - by virtue of
being raised as a non-Indian. 120 In these cases, Dr. Westermeyer found
that the children's Indian identity was weak or even absent. 2
111. Id. at 357.
112. See id. The ICWA ensures that culture remains a primary focus for a child's
future. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988).
113. Gaylene McCartney, The American Indian Child-Welfare Crisis: Cultural Gen-
ocide or First Amendment Preservation, 7 COLum. HuM. RTs. L. REv. 529, 550-51
(1975) (citing statements of Dr. Joseph Westermeyer, 1974 Hearings, supra note 23, at
45-51, and statements of Dr. Carl Mindell and Dr. Gurwitt, id. at 54-64).
114. Blanchard & Barsh, supra note 110, at 351.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 356.
118. Id.
119. Joseph Westermeyer, M.D., Ph.D., The Apple Syndrome in Minnesota: A
Complication of Racial-Ethnic Discontinuity, 10 J. OPERAToNAL PsYCH. 134 (1979).
Dr. Westermeyer testified about his research at hearings before the Subcommittee on
Indian Affairs. See 1974 Hearings, supra note 23.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 135.
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On the other hand, Dr. Westermeyer found that Indian children
who were products of the boarding school era did not seem to develop
the apple syndrome. 12 In boarding schools, children at least had
contact with other Indian children at school as well as their tribes on
occasional holidays and vacations. '3 This continued contact with In-
dian culture allowed some Indian identity to remain intact.2 4 In ad-
dition, some children raised in non-Indian homes who had some
contact with other Indians also did not develop the syndrome.1'1 In
all, the apple syndrome has devastating results. Indian children who
are placed in non-Indian homes frequently experience severe identity
confusion, especially as adolescents. 26 The suicidal tendencies are higher
for these children than for other high-risk Indian youths. 27 Further,
these children have trouble forming intimate relationships, and have
trouble with violence, promiscuity, theft, truancy, and running away,
and develop tendencies for substance abuse. 28 These individuals may
also develop a distrust of other Indian people due to a feeling of
abandonment by Indians.' 9 While an Indian child can be told by his
or her non-Indian parents to be proud of his or her Indian culture,
the mere act of being placed and raised in a non-Indian culture teaches
the child that living with Indians is not desirable. 30 In spite of these
psychological findings, Indian children continue to be placed in non-
Indian homes. One of the reasons for non-Indian placement relates to
economics. Because of the stringent residential requirements for qual-
ified foster or adoptive homes, many Indians previously could not
become foster or adoptive families. The housing requirements in the
past mandated high square footage and a certain number of separate
rooms which many Indian families did not have available or could not
afford.' 3' Thus, affluent non-Indians became parents or foster parents
for Indian children.
A non-Indian family raising an Indian child most times will not
reinforce the child's Indian identity. In a set of studies done in 1977
and 1979, one-third of the families involved in transracial adoptions
did little or nothing to foster the minority child's cultural identity. 32
122. Id. at 139.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 137.
126. See Joseph Westermeyer, Ethnic Identity Problems Among Ten Indian Psychi-
atric Patients, 25 INT'L. J. OF SOc. PSYCMATaY 188 (1979); see also Westermeyer, supra





131. Id. at 139.
132. Howard, supra note 20, at 539 (quoting RITA Smw & HowARD ALrsTmN,
TRANscRAcJL ADOPTION 11, 104 (1977)).
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Of the group surveyed, 12% stated that "[tiheir main objective [was]
to bring the child into their life-style" and that they intended "to live
as they would have if they had not adopted a child of a different
race."'3 Finally, non-Indian parents may not know or may be unable
to understand their Indian child's trauma. This parent may not em-
pathize when the child is called names such as "squaw" or "buck,"
or when in adolescence the child is not asked out on dates or does
not get hired for jobs while the child's non-Indian peers enjoy such
thin.gs. 3 4 The true dilemma is that people may discriminate against the
child because he or she is Indian, yet the child does not identify with,
nor is the child tied to, the Indian culture. 3 ' The adverse psychological
effects of placements with non-Indians support the conclusion that the
best interests of an Indian child lie in protecting and reinforcing the
tribal culture and heritage.
X. Minnesota's Application of the ICWA
As recalled from section V above, the ICWA applies only in cases
where a "child custody proceeding" is within the scope of the Act
and the child is an "Indian child."' 36 After this initial determination
has been made, courts must meet the standards for the appropriate
burden of proof through qualified expert testimony. Further, active
efforts must be made to keep the existing family unit intact. Also, the
case may be transferred to an appropriate tribal court absent good
cause to the contrary or absent any objection by either parent. Finally,
full faith and credit will be afforded any disposition by either a state
or tribal court. Minnesota courts have attempted to comply with these
standards. These efforts are analyzed below.
A. Indian Child
Courts must initially determine whether the child is an Indian child
under the ICWA. In early American history, courts used highly biased
and arbitrary standards to determine who was an Indian. A few early
Supreme Court cases concerning the natives of the Pueblos exemplify
these vague criteria. In United States v. Joseph, 37 the Supreme Court
found that the indigenous people of the Southwest were not Indians
because they were "a peaceable, industrious, intelligent, honest, and
virtuous people... Indians only in feature, complexion and a few of
their habits."'3 8 Yet in another case, United States v. Sandoval,3 9 the
Court found the Pueblos were Indians. The Court quoted agents'
reports to support its conclusion that the Pueblos were Indians that
133. Id.
134. Westermeyer, supra note 119, at 136.
135. Id.
136. See supra notes 42-44.
137. 94 U.S. 614 (1876).
138. Id. at 616.
139. 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
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needed Indian Bureau supervision.Y4 The quoted reports asserted these
people were Indians because of their drunkenness, debauchery, danc-
ing, and communal life. The Court stated that the Pueblos were a
"simple, uninformed and inferior people. ' 1 41 Fortunately, today this
blatant bigotry does not exist.
Today, the test for being an Indian child under the ICWA has
become a two-part statutory question. 42 First, the child must be either
a member of a tribe or eligible for membership in a tribe. Second,
the child must be the biological child of a tribal member.4 The tribe
has the primary power to determine its own tribal membership.'"
Written membership requirements establish tribal membership. Tribal
constitutions or other tribal law define these requirements in the tribal
roll. 4 Although membership requirements vary widely, many tribes
mandate a minimum of one-fourth degree of blood of the particular
tribe for membership.'" Yet Congress has the power to define tribal
membership for administrative purposes such as eligibility for funding,
social programs, administrative matters, and certain jurisdictional mat-
ters.' 47
The ICWA does not demand a specific blood quantum but rather
recognizes the tribe's designation of a person as a member or eligible
member of that tribe.'" A few Minnesota cases have refused to apply
the ICWA when the child involved had some Indian blood but was
neither a member nor eligible for membership in a tribe. In In re
Custody of M.A.L. ,'149 the court admitted that the maternal grandfather
was an enrolled member of a Minnesota Chippewa tribe. However,
the child was not eligible for enrollment with the Chippewa tribe. The
court recognized the child's Indian heritage. Nevertheless, the court
did not follow the ICWA. Rather, the court applied the general best
140. Id. at 39-47. The Indian Bureau was the predecessor of the BIA.
141. Id.
142. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4) (1988).
143. Id.
144. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). A tribe has the right to
define membership for its own purposes. This issue is a nonjusticiable political question.
Id. at 72.
145. COHEN, supra note 35, at 22. Following passage of the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 (IRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-470 (1988), membership has become more
formalized.
146. Cohen, supra note 35 (citing ANaEcA- INDIN PoLicY REviEw Comm'N, 95TH
CoNG., IST Sass., FINAL REPORT 108-09 (Comm. Print 1977)). Some tribes require as
much as one-half degree of tribal blood. Others allow as little as one-eighth, but allow
a person to include other tribal blood to reach a minimum quantum of total Indian
blood, such as one-fourth. Id. at 23 & n.27.
147. Id. at 23 (citing Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84-
86 (1977); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907); Simmons v. Eagle Seelatsee, 244 F.
Supp. 808 (E.D. Wash. 1965) (three-judge court), aff'd, 384 U.S. 209 (1966)).
148. 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988).
149. 457 N.W.2d 723 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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interest test.50 As a result, the child was placed with a white middle-
class family. The court based its conclusion upon the bonding and
emotional closeness between the non-Indian family and the child.,
Although the court did not apply the ICWA, it did note that the non-
Indian family committed itself to reinforcing the child's connections
with her Indian relatives and Indian heritage.1
52
In another recent decision, In re Welfare of M.M. 0., "1 an adolescent
mother and her child were considered non-Indians. Most tribes in
Minnesota require at least a one-quarter blood quantum for member-
ship. The mother in this case had only one-eighth Indian blood. Thus,
the court found she was not an Indian. Consequently, it declined
imposition of the ICWA best interest standards for Indian children as
embodied in the MIFPA. 54 Unfortunately, some children, such as
M.M.O. and M.A.L., have an obvious Indian heritage but do not fall
within the definition of the ICWA. The ICWA best interest criteria
regrettably does not protect these children.
B. Custody Determination
Secondly, for the ICWA to apply the case must involve a "custody
detenrination" as prescribed in section 1903. ss In an Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals case, DeMent v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Court,5 6 the
court found the ICWA inapplicable. The case evolved out of a prior
divorce proceeding custody determination. The court stated that the
"statute only applies to proceedings to determine foster care placement,
the termination of parental rights, preadoptive placement and adoptive
placement. ' s7
Also, in an earlier Minnesota case, Desjarlait v. Desjarlait,58 the
Act did not apply in a custody dispute which evolved out of marital
dissolution. 59 The court said the intent of the ICWA was to "preserve
Indian culture [sic] values under circumstances in which an Indian
child is placed in a foster home or other prospective institution."'' 60
Further, the court decided that the MIFPA did not apply.
Finally, the BIA established federal guidelines that suggest the stat-
utory exclusion of a "divorce proceeding" includes "other domestic
150. Id. at 727.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 727-28.
153. No. C6-89-1598, 1990 WL 13388 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1990).
154. Id. at *1.
155. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988).
156. 874 F.2d 510 (8th Cir. 1989).
157. Id. at 514.
158. 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
159. Id. at 144 (citing In re Bertelson, 617 P.2d 121, 125 (Mont. 1980); A.B.M. v.
M.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Alaska 1982)).
160. Id. (quoting Bertelson, 617 P.2d at 125).
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relations proceedings between spouses.' ' Therefore, any Indian child
custody case involving a spousal dispute will not employ the ICWA
or MIFPA.
C. Burden of Proof
If the ICWA applies to a custody case, the court must meet the
appropriate burden of proof in accordance with the Act. Congress
originally introduced the ICWA evidentiary standards for both foster
care and termination actions as "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 62 The
House Committee felt that any removal of a child from the child's
parents effected a severe penalty, possibly greater than a criminal
penalty. In spite of this, Congress amended the original bill by reducing
the standard to "clear and convincing in cases where parental rights
are not terminated."' 63 This clear and convincing standard of proof is
a minimum standard required by the Due Process Clause' 64 in any
parental rights termination process. 16 However, Congress did retain
the higher standard for termination proceedings. Therefore, as a pro-
tection under the ICWA, the burden of proof is higher in termination
proceedings involving Indian parents than the burden of proof for
non-Indian parents' termination proceedings.
Minnesota case law establishes the criteria for meeting the appro-
priate burden of proof under ICWA. In In re Welfare of Chosa,
166
the earliest Minnesota case discussing the ICWA, the court did not
apply the Act, but did set forth standards for future ICWA proceed-
ings. 67 The court stated that ICWA termination proceedings "must
be supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testi-
mony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the
child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to the child."' 6 Further, the court said
161. BIA Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. 67,584 B.3 commentary. Domestic placements that do not deprive the parents
or Indian custodian of the right to regain custody of the child upon demand.
162. HousE RFPoRT, supra note 26, at 22.
163. Id.
164. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV.
165. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747-48 (1982) (emphasis added). A
parent's rights to custody of children integrity is a fundamental liberty interest under
the Constitution and is therefore protected. See generally id. at 745-70.
166. 290 N.W.2d 766 (Minn. Ct. App. 1980).
167. Id. at 769. An eighteen-year-old Indian mother's rights were not terminated
because she showed growing maturity. She previously had a chemical dependency
problem but received some treatment. The evidence was inconclusive as to whether she
would be unable to care for her son in the future or whether his welfare would be
adversely affected. Thus, the court expressed a desire that she be monitored to ensure
that she continued to meet the challenge of parenthood.
168. Id.
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that trial courts must "make clear and specific findings which conform
to the statutory requirements for termination adjudications."'' 69 Future
courts were supposed to follow these evidentiary criteria.
1. Expert Witnesses
Under the ICWA, "qualified expert witnesses" must present testi-
mony to the court to satisfy the burden of proof for either "clear and
convincing" or "beyond a reasonable doubt.' 7 0 Individuals who pos-
sess expertise beyond the normal social worker qualifications should
present this testimony.' 7 ' Social workers ignorant of Indian cultural
values and social norms may make decisions totally inappropriate to
the context of Indian family life and often may discover neglect or
abandonment where none exists. 72 Many times, when Indian parents
leave their children for periods of time with extended family members,
courts and agencies perceive this action as abandonment. 7, Many
experts do not or cannot view the Indian child's best interest from the
federal congressional standard which includes the tribal interest. 74 This
is due, in part, to a lack of understanding or existence of a perception
that Indians are "a vanishing race" and their relationships are inher-
ently dysfunctional. 7 5 Thus, to implement placement standards which
truly reflect an Indian child's best interests, experts must possess
knowledge about Indian culture.
The application of the evidentiary standards in Minnesota has evolved
through a series of cases which define qualified expert witnesses. In
earlier cases, the qualification level of expert witnesses in ICWA cases
was quite low. As recently as 1985, in In re Welfare of T.J.J.,176 the
court found that the ICWA did not require a witness to have a
background in Indian culture. 7 Further, the court refused to apply
169. Id.
170. HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 22; see also Chosa, 290 N.W.2d at 766
(establishing Minnesota's requirements for termination proceedings).
171. Id.
172. Ronald S. Fischler, Protecting American Indian Children, 25 SOCIAL WOVaK
341, 34.2 (Sept. 1980) (quoting WIL.IAM BYLER, The Destruction of American Indian
Families 3 (Steven Unger ed., 1977)). In the past, too many "children were removed
merely because the family did not conform to the decision-maker's stereotype of what
a proper family should be." BIA Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody
Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,593 D.3 commentary.
173. Id. Many Indian tribes view aunts and uncles as important in a child's life as
the parents.
174. BLANCHAD, supra note 104, at 23.
175. Id.
176. 366 N.W.2d 651 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The trial court allowed the testimony
of two psychologists, neither of whom had extensive exposure to Indian culture. How-
ever, both had some coursework in Indian culture and one had some experience working
with Indian youths. Id. at 655.
177. Id. at 655.
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the specific standards set forth in the Minnesota Department of Public
Welfare (DPW) Manual (now the DHS Manual) concerning expert
testimony for Indian custody proceedings.178 Although the appellate
court said that the DPW guidelines were appropriate, it found that
these guidelines did not bind the trial court. Instead, the trial court
could exercise broad discretion to assess a witness' knowledge. As a
result, in T.J.J., the court terminated a mother's parental rights based
largely upon the testimony of two psychologists, both of whom pos-
sessed little knowledge and had little exposure to Indian culture.
79
This decision clearly did not meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of proof.
Fortunately, a later case, In re Welfare of B. W.,1 80 overruled the
arbitrary decisions in T.J.J. and set forth strong guidelines for expert
witness qualifications in Indian child custody proceedings. Reviewing
the Supreme Court's language in Holyfield, the B. W. court held that
the T.J.J. decision was erroneous because it left "application of the
evidentiary standards in the DHS Manual to the discretion of the state
trial courts."'' In B.W. the appellate court found that the experts
who testified at the trial court were not qualified experts pursuant to
the DHS Manual standards.182 The appellate court stated that in cases
where a trial court chooses not to apply the DHS Manual standards,
it must give specific written findings showing "good cause" reasons
for not applying the standards.' Absent such written findings, the
DHS Manual must be applied as an "explicit expression of [Minnesota]
state policy consistent with and carrying out the purposes of the federal
ICWA."' 4 The DHS Manual requires an expert witness to have "sub-
stantial knowledge of prevailing social and cultural standards and child-
rearing practices within the Indian community."
185
The court in B. W. then assessed the trial court witnesses' qualifi-
cations and found that their experience insufficiently met the DHS
178. Id. at 655. The MINN. DPW Soc. Stnv. MAuAL (now the DHS MAmuAL)
states that an expert should have "'substantial knowledge of prevailing social and cultural
standards and child rearing practices within the Indian community." Id.
179. See T.J.J., 366 N.W.2d at 655-56.
180. 454 N.W.2d 437 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). The parental rights of a mother and
father were terminated, based upon experts' testimonies. Both parents were accused of
numerous occasions of intoxication. However, the mother entered chemical dependency
treatment followed by AA meetings and later an Anti-abuse program. Several times a
social worker made unannounced visits to the home to assess the family's alcohol use.
181. Id. at 443.
182. See id. at 443-45. The case was remanded to the trial court for application of
the new more stringent standards for expert witnesses.
183. Id. at 443-44.
184. Id. at 444.
185. Id. (citing DHS MArrow, supra note 178, at XIII-3586 (last revised) (Jan. 30,
1987)). Because the DHS MAuAx. sets a higher standard of protection than the ICWA,
it should therefore be applied. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1988) (stating that the
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standards for the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. 8 6 The court
found that a caseworker who deals with Indian families is not neces-
sarily qualified. Also, a person of Indian heritage who has no recog-
nized knowledge of tribal customs does not automatically become
qualified.1 7
The court remanded the case for several reasons. First, the state's
experts lacked sufficient qualifications.' Second, the trial court dis-
regarded the testimonies of the defendant's experts, who were highly
qualified.8 9 In conclusion, the appellate court found that the evidence
presented did not "constitute the necessary proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, which proof must include qualified expert testimony."' 19
A recent decision reaffirmed the criteria established in B. W. In In
re Welfare of M.S.S.,' 9' the appellate court discovered that of the
eight witnesses who testified before the trial court, only one person
potentially qualified as an expert witness. The trial court order was
issued prior to the publication of B. W. For this reason, the appellate
cour: remanded the issue of the experts' qualifications for reconsid-
eration. 92 On remand, the trial court was instructed to follow the
standards of the DHS Manual to establish proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian
custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage
to the child."' 9 3
In the future, Minnesota courts must adhere to the standards set
forth in B. W. and M.S.S. "If the petitioning party's witnesses are not
conversant with Indian culture and child-rearing practices, the problems
the Congress has tried to remedy may remain, despite the adoption of
the Indian Child Welfare Act.'
1 94
higher standard of either state or federal law should apply to the rights of Indians).
The BIA Guidelines also set forth specified criteria for expert witnesses. See BIA
Guidelines, supra note 161, at 67,593 D.4.
186. B. W., 454 N.W.2d at 444-45.
187. Id. at 444.
188. Id. at 445.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. 465 N.W.2d 412 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991). The lower court's proceeding termi-
nated a father's parental rights. His request that the child be placed with his brother
and sister-in4aw, who were licensed foster parents, was virtually ignored in spite of the
expert testimony recommending this proposal. Also, the trial court refused to hear the
testimony of the father's brother and sister-in-law. After the trial court's termination
all relatives were forbidden visits with the child. The appellate court discussed the errors
of the lower court and remanded the case. Id. at 419.
192. Id. at 417.
193. Id. at 447 (citing ICWA, 28 U.S.C. § 1912(0). The court also referred to the
BIA guidelines which are similar to the DHS Manual guidelines.




The "active efforts" provision of the ICWA is yet another standard
that implements the Act's presumption against the termination of
parental rights and the Act's purpose of keeping the Indian family
together. The ICWA requires:
Any party seeking to effect a foster care placement of, or
termination of parental rights to, an Indian child under
State law shall satisfy the Court that 'active efforts' have
been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian
family and that these 'efforts' have proved unsuccessful. 19s
Congress adopted this criterion because "most State laws require public
or private agencies involved in child placements to resort to remedial
measures prior to initiating placements or termination proceedings, but
that these services are rarely provided." 196 The "active efforts" stan-
dard places a higher burden of proof on state agencies than the
predominately applied "reasonable efforts" standards.' 97 A court must
make a truly diligent and good faith effort to keep the family together.
This criteria is a minimum threshold even for "reasonable efforts" to
be satisfied. 9 Additionally, to meet reasonable efforts requirements,
an agency must make affirmative, repeated, and meaningful efforts to
assist parents in overcoming their problems. "Caseworkers must do
more than document failures. They have to want the family to make
it.'' 99
Until lately, Minnesota courts virtually ignored the ICWA's federal
mandate for "active efforts" and instead applied the "reasonable
efforts" standards set forth in the state statutes.w In In re R.M.M. ,201
195. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
196. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 26, at 22. When the reasonable efforts requirements
were followed the result was an avoidance of removal in 70% of the cases. A total of
20% resulted in family reunification. Only 2% resulted in adoption and 1 % in permanent
foster care. MImN. FnAL. REPORT, supra note 66 (citing DHS study of permanency
planning activities and dispositions between 1986-1988 (released Mar. 1989)).
197. DEBA RATTERmAN, REASONABLE EFFORTS, A MANUAL FOR JUDGES, NATIONAL
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CmLD ADvOcAcY AND PROTECTION - A PROJECT OF THE
ABA YOUNG LAWYER DIVISION 3 (1987). Minnesota's termination statute requires a
showing of reasonable efforts. However, the same statute now requires that the best
interest standard for Indian children follow the ICWA which calls for active efforts.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221 (West Supp. 1991).
198. RATTERmAM, supra note 197, at 13.
199. Id.
200. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221 (West Supp. 1991). In 1988, the legislature
specifically clarified the fact that reasonable efforts are not enough for cases involving
Indian children. The statute now refers to the ICWA standards.
201. 316 N.W.2d 538 (Minn. 1982). A mother's parental rights were terminated.
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the Minnesota Supreme Court found that "reasonable efforts had
'failed to correct conditions leading to a determination' of neglect."
202
The court purportedly scrutinized the evidence to determine whether
it sufficiently satisfied the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard
demanded by the ICWA.2 3 In spite of this professed scrutiny, the
mother's rights were terminated absent a showing of active efforts.
Also, the statutes require a written case plan even for a showing of
reasonable efforts; none existed in this case. 20 The court concluded
that although "victimized," the mother was "simply unable to care
for her child."' ' 5 Even if in the end the mother's rights might have
been terminated, the court should have followed the active efforts
mandate of the ICWA. The court may have prevented the breakup of
this ]Indian family.
In later cases, the courts still applied a lesser standard rather than
the required active efforts. In T.J.J.,206 the court found that the social
worker's testimony "supported a finding that the county actively
offered remedial services.' '20 The court used the key word "actively."
However, the ICWA requires that the efforts be active. These efforts
must not merely offered to the parents but must be proved unsuc-
cessful. 208 Here, the state did not meet the proper burden.
In yet another case, In re Welfare of W.R.,209 the court affirmed a
termination of parental rights, in part because "reasonable" efforts
were made which "failed to remedy the conditions that led to the
determination that the children were dependent." 210 The appellate court
The Court applied the reasonable efforts language of § 260.221 of the Minnesota Statutes
instead of the ICWA. Although there was a finding of the mother's alcohol abuse,
there appeared to be no active efforts to obtain treatment for her. Instead, the court
said that "treatment options has (sic) been available to her; but she has not made use
of them." Id. at 541. This incorrectly put the burden on her instead of the agencies.
202. Id. at 541 (citing MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 260.221 (1978)).
203. Id. at 540-41 (citing MiN. STAT. ANN. § 260,221 (1978)).
204. Id. at 542 (citing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.071 subdivision 1 (1978)).
205. Id.
206. 366 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
207. Id. (emphasis added).
208. 25 U.S.C. § 1912 (1988).
209. 379 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). A father's parental rights were
terminated because the Court found that abandonment existed. The father claimed a
lack of financial resources existed. Yet, the court found abandonment due to the father's
sporadic phone calls and sending of few gifts to his children. Also, the children were
deemed abandoned when placed with grandparents for periods of time. Further, despite
requests to the state that the children be allowed to visit and stay with the father's
parents, the arrangements were never made to help accommodate the visits. The father
was accused of harming the children. These accusations were found only through the
testimony of one social worker, who did not appear to be a qualified expert witness.




agreed with the trial court's determination that "termination was
mandated because of appellant's failure to meet minimum standards
of compliance with social service efforts to bring appellant and the
children back together." 21' More appropriately, the court should have
placed the burden of proof concerning the efforts upon the social
service agency rather than upon the parent.
21 2
Finally, a Minnesota court in M.S.S. established the correct standard
of proof required for active efforts.213 The court stated that the agency
must prove "active efforts" beyond a reasonable doubt for termination
proceedings. The court noted that this burden of proof standard had
been applied by other jurisdictions.21 4 The court in M.S.S. premised
that parental termination requires the reasonable doubt standard. Fur-
ther, it found that a court can only effect terminations by showing
that active efforts have been made and failed. Therefore, the appellate
court concluded that the "adequacy of efforts and futility of them,
as predicates to termination, must likewise be established beyond a
reasonable doubt." 215 Consequently, the court remanded M.S.S. for
consideration of a previously ignored proposal to allow the child to
be placed with the father's brother and sister-in-law. The appellate
court said "we do not believe the reasonable 'doubt standard could
have been met without consideration of this alternative plan. ' 216 The
court also noted that implementation of the father's proposed plan
would fulfill the purpose of the ICWA by preventing the breakup of
the existing Indian family.
217
3. Objections to Jurisdictional Transfer
A tribe may assume jurisdiction over a custody case involving an
Indian child. Public Law 280 still governs in Minnesota. A Minnesota
tribe establishing a tribal court approved by the Secretary of Interior
or the Red Lake Tribe exempted from Public Law 280 currently may
request exclusive jurisdiction over custody proceedings when the child
resides or is domiciled on the reservation. 2 1 A tribal court may exert
211. Id. at 548.
212. RA-rlm-uA, supra note 197, at 10. The party seeking the termination must
satisfy the Court that active efforts were made and were unsuccessful. See 25 U.S.C. §
1912(d) (1988).
213. 465 N.W.2d 412, 418-19 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
214. Id. (citing In re L.N.W., 457 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Iowa Ct. App. 1990); In re
Morgan, 364 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985); People ex rel. S.R., 323 N.W.2d
885, 887 (S.D. 1982)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 419. The court said that if the relatives were qualified foster parents,
the ultimate need for termination might be avoided.
217. Id. at 418-19.
218. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 42-43 n.16
(1989) (establishing federal definition of domicile for ICWA cases).
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exclusive jurisdiction only in the absence of good cause to the contrary
and in the absence of an objection by either parent.1 9 Congress drafted
an exclusive tribal jurisdiction provision into the Act to confirm the
developed case law which held that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction
when the child resides or is domiciled on the reservation.2
0
Tribal jurisdiction may be denied for several reasons. First, good
cause to the contrary may exist. Good cause to the contrary is present
if the child's tribe has no appropriate tribal court as defined in the
ICWA. 22' Additionally, good cause not to transfer jurisdiction may
exist if (1) the proceeding is too far along when the transfer petition
is fied; (2) the child is over twelve years old and objects; (3) the
evidence required can not be adequately presented in tribal court
without undue hardship; (4) the parents of a child over five years old
are unavailable and the child has had very minimal contact with the
tribe or its members?3 Also, the burden of establishing good cause
to the contrary is on the opposing party m To date, no Minnesota
cases address this issue. However, in light of B. W. and M.S.S.,
Minnesota courts should adhere to the decision in Holyfield as well
as to the BIA and DHS guidelines224 to resolve these issues.
Second, under the ICWA, an objection by either parent can cause
denial of exclusive jurisdiction. Two Minnesota cases construe this
situation. In In re Welfare of R.L, " 5 the Minnesota Court of Appeals
upheld a trial court's finding that there was no parental objection.
Although the mother verbally had objected to a transfer of the pro-
ceeding to tribal court, the court found ihat she impliedly consented
to the transfer by voluntarily taking .the children to the reservation
and leaving them there?216 Arguably, the verbal objection was not
"absent an objection" in the literal sense. However, the court found
that the mother's actions spoke louder than her words.
In another case concerning parental *objection, In re Welfare of
C.C.1UL., Jr.,27 the court found no objection to exist. In this case,
219. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911(b), 1918 (1988).
220. See HousE REPORT, supra note 26, at 21 (citing Wisconsin Potowatomies v.
Houston, 393 F. Supp. 719 (1973); Wakefield v. Little Light, 276 Md. 333 (1975); In
re Greybull, 543 P.2d 1079 (1975); Duckhead v. Anderson, 555 P.2d 1334 (Wash. 1976)).
221. BIA Guidelines for State Courts: Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed.
Reg. 67,584, 67,591 C.3 (1979); see also DHS MANUAL, supra note 178, at XIII-3573.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. Either or both guidelines were cited to as authoritative in M.S.S., B.W.,
and Holyfield.
225. 401 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
226. Id. at 177.
227. No. C3-88-253, 1988 WL 53115 (Minn. Ct. App. May 31, 1988). Jurisdiction
was initially granted to the tribal court. The tribal court then awarded permanent




the maternal grandparents petitioned for custody of the child, con-
tending that the mother had not knowingly consented earlier when a
state court transferred jurisdiction to the tribal court. In the alternative,
the grandparents claimed the mother was under duress at the time and
could not object. The court found that neither of these arguments
were supported by law or facts. In conclusion, the court stated that
the ICWA "does not require that a parent give consent to the transfer
of jurisdiction to the Tribal Court."m Rather, "transfer is required
when a parent has made no objection."' 9 The court was persuaded
by the fact that the mother had been represented by counsel at the
prior hearing. Finally, the previous judgment of the tribal court on
the best interests of the child was not overruled but rather given full
faith and credit by the state court.2 0 The state court found that the
appellant's desire to retain the child was not sufficient reason to
overrule the tribal court decision.23' The primary focus in such a
jurisdictional conflict "is not tribal rights versus individual rights, but
rather the right of a people to maintain a culture that has provided




X. Tribal Court Decisions
An existing appropriate tribal court has jurisdiction to adjudicate
the custody of an Indian child either by assuming original jurisdiction
or by assuming exclusive jurisdiction upon transfer from a state court
pursuant to section 1911(a) of the ICWA. The tribal court remains
best qualified to determine the future best interests of one of its
members. The Supreme Court acknowledged this premise in Holyfied 
3
when it deferred the ultimate determination to the Choctaw tribal
court. The tribal court then thoroughly assessed the case and deter-
mined the final placement based upon the children's best interests.2
4
Because Minnesota is a Public Law 280 state, it currently has only
one authorized tribal court, the Red Lake Band of Minnesota Chip-
pewa, with the exclusive authority to adjudicate child custody cases
without state involvement. Because the Red Lake tribal court does not
returned to the father. The state court found no evidence to support this allegation.
Further, the court found the tribal court would be the best forum for assessing the
child's treatment which occurred on the reservation.
228. Id. at *4.
229. Id. (emphasis added).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Blanchard & Barsh, supra note 110, at 354.
233. Id. at 353-54.
234. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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publish its opinions, an analysis of the factors that it applies to
determine the best interests of a child is not possible. However, other
tribal courts do publish decisions. These decisions are worthy of
comment at this point to ascertain how some tribal courts determine
the best interests of children.
A recent appellate tribal court decision, In re DeCoteau, Jr. ,233
reversed a lower tribal court decision to terminate a father's parental
rights. The tribal court evaluated the best interests of the child as a
determinative factor in reaching its decision. The tribal court found
that the lower court based its decision upon allegations of parental
abuse unsupported by the evidence. Quoting the ICWA and the BIA
guidelines, the court found that expert testimony must be used as
primary evidence to answer two questions: (1) Will the parent's conduct
cause serious physical or emotional harm to the child? and (2) Can
the parent be persuaded to change this damaging conduct? 2 6 The latter
quesion is similar to the active efforts requirement of the ICWA,
which mandates a concerted effort to help the parent mend their
ways.2
The court said that the collective testimonies of expert witnesses
must fully answer both questions. Also, the court found that the
experts must be qualified to be Indian experts.23s In sum, the court
found that the testimony presented to the lower court did not warrant
termination of the father's parental rights. The court said, "There is
no decision that a trial judge makes that requires a greater sense of
involvement, understanding, patience, to say nothing of judicial wis-
dom garnered over years of experience, than [a decision] that require[s]
a determination of 'what is in the best interests of a minor child."'23 9
This statement shows a compassionate insight often lacking in state
court proceedings.
Another tribal court evaluated the best interests of Indian children
in a similar fashion. In In re C.D.S. & C.M.H.,24° the grandmother
of two minor Indian children sought permanent guardianship. Because
the tribal court found the mother capable of raising her own children,
the court did not terminate her parental rights. Previously, the children
had resided with their grandmother. However, the mother refused to
235. 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6081 (N. Plains
Intertribal Ct. App. 1990).
236. Id. at 6082.
237. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (1988).
238. See DeCoteau, 17 Indian L. Rep. at 6082.
239. Id. at 6083.
240. 17 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 6083 (Ct. Indian
Offenses, Delawares, Nov. 23, 1988). The children previously lived for a time with their
grandparents. However, the natural mother had various psychological and chemical
abuse problems in the past, reformed, and then wished to have her children with her
again. She did not want the children to have any contact with the grandparents.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/10
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allow the children any further contact with their grandmother after
she resumed total parental custody.
The court resolved the dilemma between the mother and grand-
mother by formally awarding visitation rights to the grandmother
rather than awarding her the permanent guardianship she requested.
The court based its visitation award upon the best interests of the
children. The court said:
Since this is an Indian family, where grandparents often-
times provide the necessary guidance in traditional tribal
customs, history, and culture, and function as the central
part of the family, the court would find it difficult to
completely ignore the need to maintain and foster such
important relationships. The fact that the children in this
case have lived with the petitioner for a significant period
of their childhood, is a weighty factor in reaching this
conclusion.24'
Because of these factors, the court denied the mother's desires that
the children have no contact with their grandmother. However, because
of the existing feud between the two women, the court imposed
constraints on the visitation decree. The court maintained continuing
jurisdiction over the matter and ordered periodic review hearings to
monitor the situation.
242
Clearly, tribal courts like those above are fully competent to deter-
mine child custody issues. Further, they can more fully consider the
particular tribal culture and customs when making these decisions.
Finally, tribes inherently should have the right to determine the futures
of its own members.
XII. Conclusion
The provisions of the ICWA express the best interests of an Indian
child. The Act acknowledges that an Indian child's interests intertwine
with the tribe's interests. The Act embraces more culturally perceptive
criterion to assess the best interests of Indian children than previously
existed. The criterion differs from non-Indian criterion in several
respects. First, the Act furthers federal responsibility to protect tribal
sovereignty and self-determination. Also, the criterion embodies the
concept that Indian children psychologically need to maintain tribal
heritage and culture to become well-adjusted Indian adults, who have
a strong cultural identity. Further, compliance with the ICWA pre-
serves the cultural identity of tribes for future generations.
241. Id. at 6084.
242. Id.
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linnesota's legislature recognizes the need for compliance with the
ICWA. The legislature continually conforms state statutes to comport
with the provisions of the ICWA. Also, existing statutes such as
MIFPA provide some higher protections than the ICWA.
In the past, Minnesota courts have inadequately applied the provi-
sions of the ICWA in Indian child custody cases. Fortunately, Min-
nesota now applies more stringent standards in such cases. The courts
established strong standards for qualified expert witnesses to fulfill the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof that is required for
termination proceedings. In addition, courts now mandate a showing
of evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to prove that active efforts
have been made to preserve the existing Indian family.
Finally, Minnesota courts do relinquish jurisdiction to appropriate
tribal courts. In cases where the tribe can exercise exclusive jurisdiction,
Minnesota courts grant such jurisdiction absent an objection by the
parents. However, no published decisions exist to show whether courts
grant such jurisdiction absent good cause to the contrary. Once state
and tribal courts agree to tribal jurisdiction, tribes assert their right
to self-determination and thus ensure continued determination over the
future of their tribal members and tribal culture.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol17/iss1/10
